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Introduction  
During the past few years, Ohio's Ethics Laws have been the subject of intense scrutiny, 
analysis, and political debate. The purpose of this article is to review the significant legal 
and political impact of recent ethics reforms passed by the Ohio legislature in 1994. 
These reforms, which were the product of a long process of debate and compromise, 
represent the most comprehensive revision of Ohio's Ethics Laws and related statutes 
since their enactment in 1973. The importance of Ethics Laws to the public, elected office 
holders, and government employees makes it essential to understand the implications of 
the revisions to Ohio Ethics Laws.  
To provide a comprehensive understanding of ethics reforms, this article will consist of 
four major sections. First, the article will explore Ohio's Ethics Laws and the agencies 
responsible for their enforcement prior to 1994. Second, the article will discuss the 
factors which contributed to calls for reform, as well as early reform efforts. Third, the 
article will explore and analyze legislative and media responses to the call for ethics 
reform. Finally, the article will summarize the outcome of the reform process and provide 
a review of the implications of the reformed Ethics Law.  
History and Overview  
The Watergate scandal and subsequent hearings of the 1970s led to a national reform 
movement aimed at regulating the conduct of public officials and employees. Congress 
and state legislatures reacted by passing laws designed to promote ethical conduct.1 With 
passage of H.B. 55 in 1973, Ohio became one of the early states to pass laws governing 
the conflicts of interest of public officials.2  
The 1974 Ethics Law divided enforcement authority and jurisdiction among three 
entities. First, it established the House and Senate Legislative Ethics Committees to 
regulate "members of the general assembly, employees of the general assembly, and 
candidates for the office of member of the general assembly . . . ."3 Second, it created the 
Board of Commissioners on Grievances and Discipline of the Supreme Court to regulate 
"judicial officers and employees, and candidates for judicial office . . . ."4 Third, the 
General Assembly created the Ohio Ethics Commission (OEC) to regulate "all other 
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persons" covered by the Ethics Law.5 Thus, the OEC has jurisdiction over most public 
officials and employees, including state elected officials and their employees, and local 
officials, such as mayors, county commissioners, members of council, and county 
prosecutors.6 As of 1994, the OEC had jurisdiction over an estimated 16,000 elected 
officials and half-million public employees.7  
The originally enacted Ethics Law imposed a number of restrictions on public office 
holders and employees, ostensibly to encourage public confidence in government.8 The 
Ethics Law created a series of ethical standards to protect against conflicts of interest,9 
the improper influence of gifts and other things of value,10 nepotism,11 and "revolving 
door" post-employment activities.12 These standards largely attempted to prohibit factors 
of economic self-interest from creating conflicts in the actions of public officials or 
employees. In addition, violations of Ohio's Ethics Laws were made criminal offenses, 
generally first degree misdemeanors.13 However, certain provisions of the related statutes 
are treated as fourth degree felonies. 14  
In addition to new ethical standards, the Ethics Law instituted public financial disclosure 
for many public officials to require the identification and reporting of sources of potential 
financial conflict.15 Officials were required to file annual statements that account for and 
disclose sources of economic interest, including income, investments, gifts, real estate, 
creditors, and debtors.16 The OEC was charged with administering these annual financial 
disclosure requirements for candidates for state, county, and city offices, current holders 
of these offices, and many high-ranking state officials and employees.17 In 1994, 
approximately 7,200 individual financial disclosure forms were filed with the Ethics 
Commission.  
The Ethics Law also provided unique authority to agencies charged with administering it. 
The OEC was given authority to issue advisory opinions construing the law and to 
investigate potential violations.18 In an early challenge to Ohio's Ethics Law, the Tenth 
District Court of Appeals of Ohio upheld the advisory process because it encouraged the 
resolution of ethical questions prior to an official's action, instead of encouraging 
potentially unethical conduct and litigating the issue after the fact.19  
Ethics Reform  
The General Assembly created the OEC as one of three enforcement entities. The OEC is 
a bipartisan agency consisting of six members, "three of whom shall be members of each 
of the two major political parties, to be appointed by the governor with the advice and 
consent of the senate."20 Members of the Commission are appointed to staggered, six-
year terms.21 The OEC's statutory authority allows it to receive and review disclosure 
statements, receive and investigate allegations and complaints, initiate complaints, render 
advisory opinions, and "recommend legislation relating to ethics, conflict of interest, and 
financial disclosure . . ."22  
The OEC's authority to recommend legislation has served as a major catalyst for ethics 
reform. In fact, major changes to the Ethics Law in 1978 and 1986 resulted from OEC 
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recommendations. These changes, for example, authorized the OEC to require state board 
and commission members to file financial disclosure through administrative rule, and 
interpret and investigate restrictions on public contract and supplemental compensation 
that are contained in O.R.C. Sections 2921.42 and 2921.43.23 This authority to 
recommend legislation is a power that has always resided with the OEC, but has rarely 
been exercised. However, the unique social dynamics of the early 1990s again prompted 
the OEC to exercise its authority to recommend numerous changes to Ohio's Ethics Law.  
In 1990, George Voinovich won election as Governor of Ohio. As a candidate, Voinovich 
advocated a host of social reforms. One of the issues which he repeatedly stressed during 
his 1990 campaign was an efficient and ethical state government. Shortly after Governor 
Voinovich took office, the OEC realized four vacancies as a result of resignations, 
expiring terms, and the death of one of its member's. In fact, these vacancies created such 
a void in the OEC's operations that it did not have a quorum of members from January 
through May of 1991; a circumstance which barred decisive action on issues presented 
before it. These circumstances enabled Governor Voinovich to appoint all of the 
members of the OEC within his first two years as Governor. Unfortunately, none of these 
appointees had previously served on the OEC, and few had any experience with the law. 
Thus, from 1991 to 1992, these newly appointed members struggled to learn their jobs 
while attempting to exercise their responsibilities.  
Devoid of any prior context, this group endeavored, with the assistance of an experienced 
staff, to conduct its own de novo analysis of the appropriate role of the OEC and the 
Ethics Law. This task gained added importance for the members of the OEC because of a 
volley of criticism directed toward the OEC by a number of newspapers.24 In a series of 
editorials, the OEC was characterized as a "toothless tiger," "lap dog," and a "do nothing 
body."25  
As a result of their frustrations in dealing with the Ethics Law and its perceived 
deficiencies, the members of the OEC established a Subcommittee on Legislation in 
January of 1992. This subcommittee consisted of two OEC members and was delegated 
the original task of examining the Ohio Ethics Law and suggesting reforms to strengthen 
its provisions. At about this time, the OEC was contacted by Representative Vernon 
Sykes, who had been pursuing his own independent efforts to reform and strengthen 
Ohio's Ethics Law. After several discussions with the OEC, Representative Sykes agreed 
not to introduce his legislation, pending the OEC's review efforts.  
After reviewing the legislative changes suggested by Representative Sykes, the media, 
and OEC members and staff, the OEC's Subcommittee on Legislation met to discuss 
ideas for reform. On April 10, 1992, the Subcommittee issued a memorandum outlining 
areas identified as "essential" for reform. The major objectives of the reform proposal 
were: (1) to increase the funding of the Ohio Ethics Commission to meet the 
overwhelming public demand upon its limited resources; (2) to provide for increased 
public accountability in the enforcement of Ohio's Ethics Law; (3) to consider the 
benefits to the public of independent prosecutorial power granted to the Commission; (4) 
to institute alternative dispute resolution strategies, (5) to provide additional authority to 
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render advice; and (6) to promote the uniform application of the Ethics Laws and related 
statutes.26 The proposal served to stimulate significant debate among the members of the 
OEC. As a product of this debate, and aided by the input of OEC staff members, the OEC 
developed and agreed upon a comprehensive legislative reform proposal addressing these 
issues.  
The issue of increased funding was viewed as essential to the effective operation of the 
OEC. During the 1992 fiscal year, the OEC had a budget of about $660,000,27 which was 
sufficient to employ only eleven staff positions,28 the lowest level of staffing since 
1977.29 In fact, the OEC had authority to employ a staff of fifteen, a power that had 
resulted from early efforts to bolster ethics administration from the last ethics reform 
enacted in 1986.30 However, the effect of successive budget cuts had reduced the staff by 
nearly one-third since 1990.31 The subsequent loss of sufficient staff and resources 
clearly hampered the efforts of the Commission to perform its obligations a fact 
recognized by some newspaper editorials.32  
In an effort to remedy these financial problems, the OEC proposed an independent 
operating fund that would not be dependent upon general revenue financing. This fund 
was to be created from a $25 filing fee to accompany the financial disclosure filings of 
those compensated for service in public office or public employment, a late filing fee for 
those who did not file on time, the ability of a court to impose and collect fines from 
individuals who violated the ethics law, and the right to recover the costs of investigation 
and prosecution from individuals convicted of ethics violations.  
It was estimated that a $25 filing fee would generate approximately $200,000 in 
additional revenue for the OEC. The late filing fee would act to both conserve OEC funds 
and to generate revenue from delinquent financial disclosure filings. The OEC was also 
concerned with the administrative costs incurred in enforcing compliance with financial 
disclosure requirements. For example, at the time of this legislative proposal in 1992, the 
OEC had mailed over 1,300 reminder letters by regular mail, and 331 warning letters by 
certified mail, to delinquent financial disclosure filers. If a late fee reduced the number of 
delinquent filers, the OEC would have saved money in 1992, reflected by the cost savings 
of copying charges, mailings, and personnel time. For those individuals who continued to 
be delinquent, the late filing fee would reimburse the OEC for the extra costs associated 
with processing the delinquent filings. Furthermore, the OEC believed that the resources 
saved could be more appropriately applied to the performance of other public 
responsibilities.  
The proposed legislation would have also granted the OEC the right to recover 
investigative costs. A significant Ethics Law prosecution is similar to any other white-
collar criminal prosecution, requiring hundreds of hours of investigation and the 
production and analysis of thousands of pages of documents and statements. The right to 
recover the costs of investigation would provide for the payment of the reasonable 
expenses of investigation and prosecution. In short, the OEC's sought after amendment 
would have provided for the recovery of investigative costs in a manner similar to that of 
other law enforcement and administrative agencies.33  
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A primary legislative consideration for OEC members was the issue of public 
accountability for investigative and enforcement responsibilities. The OEC believed that 
it was essential that it be empowered to comment publicly once a final disposition was 
reached in an investigation, or when a case was referred to a local prosecutor for 
prosecution. This authority was necessary, the OEC reasoned, in order to assure the 
public that ethical issues were thoroughly addressed. The OEC also believed that a person 
bringing a complaint to the OEC should be notified if the complaint were dismissed. 
However, then existing statutory authority did not authorize the OEC to respond to public 
or media inquiries about whether the OEC had performed its responsibilities;34 nor did 
the OEC possess any independent prosecutorial powers.35 In fact, then existing Ethics 
Laws specifically prohibited any disclosure of information regarding investigations and 
prosecutions, except in very limited circumstances.36 The OEC, unlike most other 
investigative agencies, was barred from public disclosure of a referral for prosecution 
unless the prosecutor took action.37 If a prosecution did not occur, the OEC had no 
authority to notify the general public that the Commission had in fact performed its 
responsibilities.38 Any violation of these confidentiality restraints was subject to criminal 
penalty.39  
The OEC's inability to comment promoted the perception that ethics violations were not 
investigated or referred for prosecution. Violators could deny wrongdoing and 
prosecutors were relieved of the responsibility of publicly justifying the failure to 
prosecute an evidenced referral. The significance of this problem was demonstrated by 
the fact that 34% of the OEC's referrals in the prior ten years were not prosecuted. OEC 
staff had experienced responses to referrals for prosecution, supported by sufficient 
probative evidence, that were summarily declined for prosecution in view of the inability 
of the OEC to publicly comment upon the referral. In one case, private party litigants 
were successful in removing an elected official from office, on the basis of an appellate 
court's specific finding of nepotism related misconduct, even though the same official had 
not been prosecuted.40  
In response to these difficulties, the OEC proposed to modify existing ethics authority to 
permit public comment by the OEC when a final disposition was reached in an 
investigation, or at the time when the OEC referred an ethics case for prosecution. The 
OEC believed that these reforms would allow public scrutiny of public officials and, in 
turn, promote public accountability among public officials. These provisions were viewed 
as consistent with processes whereby other law enforcement agencies have been given 
authority to comment upon their referral of a case for prosecution. The OEC noted that its 
standard for referral a preponderance of the evidence was even more demanding than the 
probable cause test used by other enforcement agencies. These proposed ethics reforms 
were also consistent with the approaches of other states which permit their ethics 
commissions to make their findings public upon final action of the commission.41  
The OEC's proposal to acquire independent prosecutorial power was also a product of its 
past experience. Based upon past case referrals, the OEC saw a significant number of its 
cases end in dismissal for lack of prosecution by local prosecutors. This phenomena 
occurred despite the OEC's extensive investigations and collection of significant evidence 
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in support of the referral for prosecution. In fact, a full one-third of the OEC's referrals 
were not prosecuted. Despite prosecutorial inaction, then-existing law precluded the OEC 
from publicly commenting that it had investigated and referred these matters to local 
prosecutors.42  
Even the cases in which local prosecutors wished to proceed presented difficulties with 
regard to OEC involvement in the prosecution. On occasion, local prosecutors had 
requested that OEC staff, due to their expertise in the subject, consider serving as the 
special prosecutor to prosecute referred cases. However, this option was unavailable to 
the OEC, which only had the authority to conduct investigations throughout the state, not 
authority to remedy alleged violations.43 As a result, the OEC and the public were 
dependent upon local prosecutors for remedying ethics violations. This structural 
arrangement often proved difficult for prosecutors due to competing time demands, lack 
of expertise, and pre-existing personal, professional, and legal relationships between the 
prosecutors and those accused of an ethics violation.  
In an attempt to promote the public's interest in prosecuting cases that were supported by 
objective, factual evidence, the OEC suggested a number of reforms. Based upon an 
analogous provision in a Nebraska statute,44 the Ethics Commission requested the 
authority to, upon the request of the local prosecutor, assign its staff to assist in the 
presentation and prosecution of an Ethics Law referral. In addition, under the OEC's 
proposal, the prosecutor would retain the right to determine whether to prosecute a 
referral. However, if the local prosecutor refused to prosecute, or failed to prosecute 
within 120 days, the OEC would then have the authority to prosecute the referral.  
Recognizing that certain ethics violations are less egregious than others, the OEC also 
sought to establish alternative dispute resolution strategies to resolve less serious charges. 
The OEC's inability to distinguish between egregious and non-egregious Ethics Law 
violations arose under then existing law, which required that if the OEC found that the 
allegations were not supported by a preponderance of the evidence, "it shall dismiss the 
complaint . . . ."45 On the other hand, if the OEC found that "the facts alleged in the 
complaint are true . . . , it shall report its findings to the appropriate prosecuting authority 
for proceedings in prosecution of the violations . . . ."46 This approach provided the OEC 
with only two options do nothing, or prosecute. These options did not allow the OEC to 
distinguish between cases based upon the severity of the alleged violation. In other 
words, the OEC was required to prosecute first-time, non-continuing, non-serious 
violations in the same manner as multi-million dollar, continuing public contract frauds. 
Although none of the cases among the 34% of unprosecuted referrals by the Commission 
involved a violation of such lower level severity, these less serious, first-time breaches of 
the Ethics Law had few viable remedies.  
In an effort to more effectively, equitably, and efficiently resolve alleged violations 
arising under the Ethics Law, the Ethics Commission sought to institute a variety of 
alternative resolution procedures, including mediation, restitution, rescission of affected 
contracts, forfeiture of benefits, and resignation of office.47 As a safeguard against the 
arbitrary application of these proposed resolution procedures, the OEC mandated that 
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imposing these strategies required the agreement of the party against whom the complaint 
was made. The OEC believed that settlement authority, including alternative dispute 
resolution, would promote a more expeditious and equitable resolution of alleged ethics 
violations. In addition, less serious cases would not require the massive expenditures 
attendant to the then existing law, which imposed mandatory prosecution of all Ethics 
Law violations, no matter how trivial.  
The OEC's last major recommendation was to provide for the uniform application of 
ethics laws to all public officials. This recommendation was directed at rescinding a 
recent amendment to public contract restrictions of ethics-related provisions, which was 
written to provide an unqualified exemption for law directors and prosecutors to hire their 
private practice business associates to provide legal services for their city or county.48 
This exemption, passed in late 1992 as part of a budget correction bill, directly 
contradicted the language of O.R.C. § 2921.42, which prohibited any public official from 
using their authority or influence to secure the services of a business associate.49 The 
Ohio Prosecuting Attorneys Association and the Ohio Municipal Attorneys Association 
promoted this exemption in response to an earlier OEC advisory opinion,50 which applied 
the restrictions of O.R.C. § 2921.42 to law directors and prosecutors in a fashion similar 
to the public contract section's application to other public officials.51 The legislative 
response and resulting amendment exempted prosecutors and law directors entirely from 
having to satisfy the limited pre-existing exemptions that were contained in Section 
2941.42. In other words, these officials no longer had to affirmatively demonstrate that 
the services were necessary, that the services were unobtainable elsewhere for the same 
or lower cost, that the provider treated the political subdivision in a similar or preferential 
fashion as other clients, or that the transaction was conducted at arm's length, with full 
knowledge by the political subdivision involved with the public servant.52  
In response to passage of this exemption, a number of other public servants lobbied for 
the same exemption. As a result of these developments, the OEC believed that unlimited 
exemptions to ethics laws did not promote good public policy. In response, the OEC 
called for uniform application of the law by the elimination of exemptions for specific 
public employees. Thus began the road to reform.  
Introduction of Ethics Reform Legislation  
Once the OEC agreed upon its reform proposal, it contacted Representative Sykes and the 
leadership of the Ohio General Assembly. The OEC's objective was to discuss this 
proposal with all interested parties in an effort to promote bipartisan support. Initial 
discussions with key political figures such as House Speaker Vern Riffe and Minority 
Leader Jo Ann Davidson proved very productive. With minor modifications, most of the 
General Assembly members the OEC contacted indicated that they supported the 
reforms.  
In April of 1993, bipartisan co-sponsors Representative Sykes and Representative 
Batchelder introduced the reform legislation with the support of over forty members of 
the Ohio House.53 Newspapers throughout the state hailed the proposal as "good 
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bipartisan thinking"54 that "deserves applause;"55 and a shining example of "good 
legislation that could lead to good government."56  
The legislation, introduced as H.B. 285, was assigned to the House Ethics and Standards 
Committee. This commit  
tee consisting of eight members and chaired by Representative Katherine Walsh and 
Vice-Chaired by Representative Sykes seemed encouraged by the favorable public 
reaction to the bill. On April 27, 1993, OEC members testified in support of their 
legislative reform proposal before the committee.57 However, as a result of these 
proceedings and subsequent meetings with some members of the Legislative Committee, 
it became apparent that OEC-proposed reforms would be very difficult to enact.  
Members of the Legislative Committee and public lobbyists especially the Ohio 
Prosecuting Attorney Association strongly objected to many of provisions in the 
legislation.58 The Prosecuting Attorney Association (PAA) attacked the legislation even 
though some of its members provided written support for some of the proposed changes. 
The opposition groups attacked the provision granting independent prosecutorial power 
to the OEC as a violation of the separation of powers doctrine, arguing that this type of 
authority should rest with a locally-elected prosecutor, whom the voters could hold 
publicly accountable at the ballot box. The opposition groups also challenged the OEC's 
request for authority to publicly comment on its referrals for prosecution because of fears 
that such authority would both unduly prejudice public officials accused of ethics 
violations and lead to trials conducted by the press. As to the conflict of interest 
provisions, the PAA opposed the elimination of the general exceptions which allowed 
public officials to hire business associates. Lobbyists and legislators argued that 
exempting prosecutors from the conflict of interest provision would both address the 
personnel shortages that many counties face, and ultimately lead to financial savings. 
Finally, the opposition groups alleged that the provision allowing independent funding of 
the OEC was an undesirable delegation of legislative authority over financial 
appropriations.  
Meetings between the Chair of the OEC and the Chair of the House Ethics and Standards 
Committee were held to determine whether there was room for legislative compromise. 
The chair of the Legislative Committee maintained that the changes sought were non-
negotiable and that it would be helpful for the OEC to assist in reformulating its proposal 
to promote the objectives of the Legislative Committee. In response to these requests, the 
Chair of the OEC met with other commission members to elicit their response. Although 
members were concerned about the prospect of alienating those in control of the 
governmental processes, they believed that most of the reforms sought were essential to 
the operation and administration of effective government. As a result, the Commission 
agreed that the best response would be to accept some of the Legislature's demands, 
suggest compromises to others, and hold steadfast in their opposition to those they 
considered destructive to the spirit of the reform proposal. The OEC drafted a letter to the 
Chair of the Legislative Ethics Committee, which attempted to clearly communicate the 
rational of the OEC's position.59  
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In its correspondence, the OEC agreed to drop its request for independent prosecutorial 
powers. However, the OEC restated its position that this power did not violate the 
separation of powers doctrine. In fact, the OEC believed that the legislature could 
delegate authority to prosecute to any executive entity and that such prosecutorial 
authority was not the exclusive province of the county prosecutor.60 However, 
recognizing the strength of the argument that prosecutorial power should rest with 
locally-elected prosecutors, the OEC agreed to eliminate the provision. Furthermore, in 
accord with the Ohio Legislature's stated political concerns, the OEC argued that its 
ability to publicly comment on a case referral was even more important, in light of its 
concessions with regard to prosecutorial powers. In short, the legislative committee's 
supposed benefits of being able to hold local elected prosecutors accountable could not 
be realized without the OEC's power of public comment. Under then existing law, the 
OEC could not comment on any referral of an Ethics Law violation and any informed 
judgment about the cooperation of the accused officeholder was forbidden.61  
The legislature's strong pre-disposition to provide exemptions to the conflict of interest 
provision resulted in the OEC's concession to submit language permitting a public 
official to hire a business associate or partner. While the OEC reasserted its belief that 
these exemptions were not sound public policy, it offered a compromise provision which 
allowed public officials to hire business associates under the conditions of appropriate 
safeguards, which were similar to then existing exemptions under the law. The proposed 
language required OEC oversight of such hiring arrangements, a demonstration of need, 
and other regulatory factors.  
Finally, the OEC reasserted its desire for increased and independent funding in order to 
fulfill its statutory functions. The OEC argued that the requested funding would help 
recoup personnel and resource losses, provide salaries for additional staff members, and 
facilitate the computerization of OEC's functions.  
The OEC never received a formal response to this letter. Moreover, concerns about 
following the Ohio Legislature's direction of Ethics Law reform mounted as rumors of 
significant revisions circulated throughout Ohio.62 The OEC's worst fears were realized 
when the Legislative Ethics Commission's staff informed OEC members that the House 
of Representatives had drafted and ultimately passed Substitute H.B. 285.63  
Many OEC members believed that Substitute H.B. 285 was weak legislation. In an article 
published in the Cleveland Plain Dealer on June 17, 1993, the author pointed out that the 
"bill originally aimed at strengthening Ohio's Ethics Commission may instead weaken 
state law . . ."64 Further, the article chronicled how the House Ethics and Standards 
Committee had added:  
amendment after amendment that removed many of the new powers and independent 
budget authority the watchdog group had sought. The Commission wanted authority to 
prosecute and comment publicly on cases, but the committee rejected that. The 
Commission wants to hire more investigators and to close a loophole, created by the 
legislature last year, that allows county prosecutors to hire their business partners. But 
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another amendment would have the effect of allowing not just prosecuting attorneys to 
hire their business partners, but other public officials as well.65  
The extent of the political opposition that the OEC faced was also revealed by an 
interview with Representative Patrick Sweeney, a member of the Ethics and Standards 
Committee and a powerful leader in the House.66 The Cleveland Plain Dealer reported 
that Representative Sweeney offered a half-dozen amendments, many of which would 
purportedly weakened the bill.67 Moreover, Sweeney stated that the OEC's request to 
prosecute cases was "at the height of arrogance" and jokingly suggested that an 
amendment be offered to get the members of the OEC "fired for malfeasance."68  
A review of the contents of Substitute H.B. 285 by the OEC staff confirmed the several 
significant legal disparities existed between the legislation as originally proposed and the 
substitute bill. First, instead of providing for public comment on investigation referrals, 
Substitute H.B. 285 further restricted the OEC's ability to publicly comment on cases. In 
addition, language in the OEC's bill which would have allowed the OEC to notify 
complainants and the public about the results of an ethics investigation was removed. 
Second, instead of providing independent funding to the OEC, the bill would have 
imposed filing fees and late costs that would have gone directly to the general revenue 
fund. Third, instead of eliminating exemptions to hiring business partners, the law would 
have broadened the exemptions to include all local government officials and would not 
require any approval or cost comparison.69 Finally, the substitute bill eliminated the 
provision granting independent prosecutorial authority to the OEC.  
Members of the House Ethics Committee also added two other major provisions. While 
these provisions arguably had strong public policy roots, they created additional 
opposition to eventual passage of the bill.70 At the recommendation of one House Ethics 
Committee member, the bill, for the first time, would have incorporated a requirement for 
elected school board members to file financial disclosure statements with the OEC. The 
Legislature incorporated a similar bill, H.B. 201, into H.B. 285 to create this 
requirement.71 However, the General assembly had failed to pass legislation proffering 
this requirement in previous sessions.72  
Another member of the House Ethics Committee suggested adding a requirement for 
continuing ethics education for all elected public officials. This requirement, as it evolved 
and was incorporated into H.B. 285, would have required an extensive certification and 
sanction process for all of the approximate 16,000 elected officeholders in the state. 
Though not proposed by the OEC, this mandatory ethics training was to be formulated 
and administered by the OEC. Both of these new provisions were added to the version of 
Substitute H.B. 285 as referred from the House Ethics Committee.  
The House Ethics Committee referred H.B. 285 to the House Finance Committee since it 
contained an appropriation for the OEC. This general revenue appropriation was provided 
to the OEC to increase its advisory and investigative resources, and enhance its computer 
system. However, the Finance Committee again amended the bill several times on 
substantive issues that had nothing to do with the appropriation of funds. For example, 
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the Finance Committee amended the requirement for filing financial disclosure 
statements by members of the board of education of larger school districts by changing 
the level of student attendance, referred to as the "average daily membership," within the 
school district. This change expanded the number of school districts whose school board 
members would be required to file disclosure statements. Another member of the Finance 
Committee proposed that school district superintendents, treasurers, and clerks (later 
changed to business managers) should have to file a financial disclosure statement. With 
the large expansion in the number of financial disclosure filers and the requirement to 
administer compulsory ethics training to all elected officials, the additional funding 
provided to the OEC would have been dissolved by these new rather than existing 
responsibilities.  
Another amendment, sponsored by Representative Michael Shoemaker, created an 
additional exemption within O.R.C. § 2921.42 which would have allowed township 
officials to do business with their own township in transactions involving $5,000 or 
less.73 This amendment did not require the application of pre-existing exemptions.74 
Shoemaker stated that this exemption was created on behalf of a gas station owner 
serving as a Township Trustee within his district. The bill, which included all of these 
amendments, passed by vote of the full House of Representatives and was sent to the 
Senate for action.  
Prior to consideration of H.B. 285 in the Senate, a new ethics issue which was not 
addressed in H.B. 285 captured the attention of the Legislature. Examining the practice of 
giving "honorarium" to legislators, the press began exploring the relationship of 
individual members of the General Assembly to lobbyists, and their clients.75 Payments 
of honoraria to leadership and committee chairs had reportedly become prevalent in the 
Legislature.76 These payments were unrelated to campaign contributions.77 The OEC had 
advised that honoraria was generally prohibited to those officials subject to the OEC's 
authority, where the honoraria was provided by those doing business with public 
officials.78 Yet, the Legislature had exempted itself from prohibitions on the receipt of 
honoraria.79  
The alleged honoraria abuses subsequently identified by the press,80 and increased media 
scrutiny of this practice,81 led to the introduction of H.B. 492, after the House had 
considered H.B. 285. The purpose of H.B. 492 was to respond to  
growing media attention and public perception of honoraria by banning its receipt and 
significantly changing financial disclosure provisions to require the increased disclosure 
of all sources of income.82 H.B. 492 subjected lobbyists to new disclosure requirements 
and placed the jurisdiction for these requirements in a new Joint Legislative Ethics 
Committee (JLEC).83 The JLEC combined the formerly separate House and Senate Ethics 
Committees.84 H.B. 492 also created an Office of Legislative Inspector General to staff 
the JLEC and administer these new responsibilities.85 Due to continuous negative media 
coverage of events involving receipt of honoraria, the House passed H.B. 492 and 
referred it , along with Substitute H.B. 285, to the Senate.86  
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The Senate referred both H.B. 285 and 492 to the Senate Task Force on Campaign 
Finance Reform (STFCFR), Chaired by Senator Robert Cupp. After the STFCFR 
conducted hearings on both bills, the bills moved through a series of final legislative 
action in rapid succession. After a Senate Campaign Task Force Subcommittee redrafted 
major portions of both bills, they proceeded quickly through the full STFCFR and to the 
Senate floor for passage.87  
By the time the Senate first addressed H.B. 492, the Senate Subcommittee had created 
major changes to the legislation. Different types and levels of increased financial 
disclosure, arguably included as a response to the prior receipt and non-disclosure of 
honoraria were now included in the bill. These changes not only barred honoraria for 
members of the General Assembly, but required that many state and local officials would 
be barred from receiving honoraria as well, and would have to meet lower income 
thresholds for the disclosures of income from the original level of $500 to $75.88 In 
addition, these individuals would also be required to disclose expenses received for 
travel, lodging, and meals and beverages.89  
The Subcommittee's version of H.B. 492 also changed the uniform application of one 
level of disclosure for all filers.90 Instead of flat disclosure levels, the substitute 
legislation created different levels of disclosure for members of the General Assembly, 
state officials and county office holders, and local elected officials.91 In response to the 
growing honoraria scandal, H.B. 492 imposed the highest of these levels of disclosure on 
House and Senate members.92 For the first time ever, H.B. 492 also differentiated the 
level of disclosure required for local officials holding similar positions based upon 
whether their political subdivision or governmental agency paid them less than $16,000.93  
After passage of Sub. H.B. 492, the Senate, led by Senator Cupp, chair of the Senate Task 
Force on Campaign Finance Reform, restored the OEC's original statutory language to 
H.B. 285. The unfolding honoraria scandal and the attendant media attention to the 
provisions of Substitute H.B. 285 allowed the OEC and its staff to re-focus attention to 
the substance of the OEC's original proposals.  
With respect to the funding proposals originally proposed by H.B. 285 to support and 
enhance the OEC's jurisdiction, the Senate amended the House bill to earmark funds 
received through filing fees, late fees and related expenses, to an independent fund 
controlled by the OEC.94 The Senate substituted a flat filing fee with a schedule of fee 
payments based upon the costs charged to file for candidacy for elected office.95  
The Senate also authorized the OEC to provide advice to public officials by issuing both 
formal advisory opinions and providing written staff opinions.96 In addition, the Senate 
removed House amendments to H.B. 285 which prohibited the OEC from assisting 
prosecutors in pursing ethics violations.97 It also moderated H.B. 285's requirement for 
financial disclosures by school district superintendents, treasurers, and business managers 
by mandating that the disclosures be filed confidentially, subject to review and 
confidential audit examination for potential conflicts.98  
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The Senate also struck a compromise with the House on its proposal to create a 
mandatory continuing ethics education program for elected officials.99 In lieu of a 
mandatory program, the Senate created a temporary provision within H.B. 285 requiring 
the OEC to conduct a study of the concept of mandatory ethics education and training, 
and to report the results of that study to the General Assembly for further 
consideration.100 The Senate also retained the increased appropriation for the OEC to 
bolster its efforts to meet its advisory and investigation mandates, and increase its 
computer resources.101 As a result, the press generally applauded the Senate's efforts in 
strengthening H.B. 285.102  
Due to the press and public's focus on ethics and the continued exposure of honoraria 
practices in the General Assembly, Sub. H.B. 285 and 492 proceeded quickly to final 
consideration and passage.103 With minor floor amendments in the Senate, the General 
Assembly passed Sub. H.B. 492 in late January, 1994. The Governor signed the bill on 
May 12, 1994. The General Assembly passed Sub. H.B. 285, which became effective 
with the Governor's signature on March 2, 1994.  
Outcome of Ohio's Ethics Reform  
Sub. H.B. 285  
The combined effects of Am. Sub. H.B. 285 and 492 resulted in the most comprehensive 
reform of ethics-related provisions in the twenty-year history of the Ethics Law. H.B. 285 
largely resulted in much needed change in the authority and processes of administrating 
the Ethics Law, and passage of the bill helped the OEC achieve many of its reform goals.  
To better able the OEC to advise public officials and investigate allegations of ethical 
misconduct, the General Assem  
bly substantially increased the OEC's funding through a continuing increase in the OEC's 
general revenue appropriation. This funding increase included a one-time appropriation 
for the enhancement of computer resources in order to improve financial disclosure 
administration and general operations. However, expanded disclosure requirements 
resulted in more than 10,000 financial disclosure filings in 1994.  
Funding for Fiscal Years 1995 and 1996 enabled the OEC to re-create and expand lost 
public information and education efforts. In Fiscal Year 1995, the OEC conducted 145 
separate educational and training sessions throughout the State of Ohio. In August of 
1994, the OEC also completed and returned to the General Assembly an examination of 
Continuing Ethics Education. The Commission concluded that the voluntary use of 
existing networks of public officials and employees could reach most elected 
officeholders to provide effective ethics training and education, without the bureaucracy 
necessary to support a compulsory system of certification. Funding provided by Am. Sub. 
H.B. 285 replenished the investigative staff of the OEC and allowed it, for the first time 
since 1988, to expand its advisory and education staff.104 An independent fund under 
control of the OEC was generated and funded by filing fees, fines, costs, and the like.105  
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The OEC's efforts to obtain more consistent enforcement of alleged ethics violations 
through the enactment of independent prosecutorial authority, conditioned upon the first 
refusal of local prosecutors to prosecute, did not pass the General Assembly. However, 
other significant changes were enacted. For instance, Sub. H.B. 285 authorized the OEC 
to publicly comment, in a limited manner, on the fact that a criminal ethics referral had 
been made to a prosecutor, who did not subsequently follow through on the referral.106  
In several major ethics cases referred since the enactment of H.B. 285, special 
prosecutors have been readily appointed to review and prosecute ethics-related referrals. 
In three such cases, members of the OEC staff have been appointed to assist the local 
prosecutor.107 Sub. H.B. 285 enabled the OEC to resolve, with the agreement of a 
potential respondent, allegations that may not have been previously addressed under the 
law. First-time, non-serious, non-continuing ethics violations may now be addressed 
through the use of remedial processes such as mediation, alternative dispute resolutions, 
restitution, resignation from office, contract invalidation, or other options that do not 
require the time and resources inherent in criminal prosecutions. 108  
In order to expedite replies to officials who request informal opinions from the OEC, 
H.B. 285 also authorizes the OEC to issue written staff advisory opinions that provide the 
same reliability to the requester as a formal OEC opinion.109 This authority allows the 
OEC to focus upon issues of new and unique advisory construction under the law, while 
staff can apply existing OEC precedent to more routine and fact-specific requests. In 
addition, H.B. 285 provides the OEC with the resources necessary to examine 
educational efforts for public officials such as continuing ethics education.  
H.B. 285 also embodies significant changes to financial disclosure requirements. At the 
OEC's recommendation, a new category of state officials was created to encompass those 
individuals who were appointed to exempt state positions and paid according to a 
specified salary schedule.110 Individuals falling within this category were required to file 
public financial disclosures.111 H.B. 285 also requires members of and candidates for the 
board of education in school districts with an average daily student population of over 
12,000 students to file public disclosure statements.112 The superintendents, treasurers, 
and business managers for all school districts within the state are also required to file 
confidential financial disclosure statements, subject to review by the OEC and state audit 
examiners.113 In total, these requirements added an estimated 2000 to 2100 new financial 
disclosure filers in 1995. To expedite filings, H.B. 285 authorizes the filer to comply with 
the required deadline by mailing the disclosure form.114  
Am. Sub. H.B. 492  
Am. Sub. H.B. 492 significantly changes the substance of the Ethics Laws as well. In an 
attempt to remedy past abuses of financial disclosure requirements regarding honoraria, 
this legislation bans honoraria and changes disclosure standards for public officials and 
lobbyists, to require more detailed disclosure of sources and amounts of income. The bill 
also changes previous disclosure provisions by mandating disclosure according to a 
sliding scale.115 These different levels and types of disclosure are required for income 
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first received after April 15th of 1994.116 Legislators are required to meet the highest 
level of disclosure, with many state officials required to provide the most extensive 
amount of information.117 For the first time, H.B. 492 divides the level of required 
disclosure among local officials based upon whether the official was compensated more 
than $16,000 by his or her political subdivision for the performance of official duties.118 
H.B. 492 also requires the presidents of colleges and universities to file confidential 
financial statements.119 However, this requirement changes the result of existing 
administrative rules originally put in place by the OEC in 1978, which had required 
college and university file public disclosures.120  
For many public officials who are required to comply with financial disclosure, H.B. 492 
adds new requirements. These new requirements were largely the result of the OEC's 
efforts to require increased public exposure of all types of income. Sources of income, 
regardless of amount, are required to be disclosed, replacing the previous standard of 
limiting disclosure of income to amounts excess of $500.121 The identity and amount of 
incomes received from sources doing business with a public agency served by the public 
official are now subject to disclosure.122 Incomes from lobbyists and clients, under  
certain circumstances and subject to exceptions protecting the confidentiality of the 
client, are also subject to disclosure.123 Legislative and executive agent lobbyists 
expenditures on behalf of public officials must now be listed on disclosure statements,124 
as are most sources of gifts.125 Expenses received for official travel, meals and lodging 
are subject to disclosure, subject to minimum amounts.126 The origin of funds for meals 
and beverages above a minimum amount were also required to be disclosed.127 However, 
college and university trustees, and local officials compensated less than $16,000 
annually are exempt from these new requirements and remained subject to the old 
standards.128  
H.B. 492 bans honoraria for those filing financial disclosure statements. The bill, for the 
first time, defines "honorarium"129 and creates exceptions allowing the payment of travel, 
meal and lodging expenses for speeches given by public officials where the public 
official participates in a panel discussion or belongs to a national organization to which 
the public agency pays dues.130 H.B. 492 bars voting by legislators on legislation 
supported by a lobbyist who is employed by the legislator.131 It also changes the reporting 
requirements for legislative and executive lobbyists.132 H.B. 492 combines the House and 
Senate Ethics Committees into a single Joint Legislative Ethics Commission (JLEC) with 
jurisdiction over members of the General Assembly, and creates an Office of Legislative 
Inspector General to administer the lobbyists' filings.133  
Despite the benefits of both bills, each continues to foster exemptions to the applicability 
of the Ethics Laws. For instance, H.B. 285 creates two new exemptions in the Ethics 
Laws' public contract restrictions.134 One exemption authorizes prosecutors and law 
directors to hire private law practice business associates, subject to controls that were less 
demanding than previous exemptions.135 Township trustees were removed from the 
application of these same public contract provisions in transactions under $5,000, without 
the protection to the public provided by the previous exemptions under the statute.136 
College and university presidents are no longer required to file public financial disclosure 
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under H.B. 492 in comparison to the approximately 100 other chief administrative 
officers compensated less than that of their academic counterparts.137 College and 
university presidents and their trustees, are also exempted from the newly enacted ban on 
"honoraria."138 While H.B. 492 exposes members of the Legislature and their staff to 
portions of the revolving door prohibition, it exempts those currently serving from the 
application of these restrictions until after December 31, 1995.139  
Conclusion  
The convergence of a unique set of factors provided the impetus for passage of the most 
comprehensive reform of Ohio's Ethics Laws in their twenty year history. Newspaper 
editorial criticisms of the OEC, a new Governor, and a Commission composed of entirely 
new and inexperienced members lead the OEC to investigate (and ultimately propose) 
significant changes with regard to Ethics Law enforcement and funding, as well as public 
accountability for Ethics Law violations. At its inception, this reform proposal brought 
intense and protracted political debate. Initially, Ohio House Representatives rejected 
most of the OEC's proposals and proposed a substitute bill. However, highly visible 
investigative reports initiated by the press served to stimulate renewed public interest in 
Ethics Law reforms, and the Ohio General Assembly eventually reinstated most of the 
OEC's original proposals.  
While a decisive evaluation of many of the aspects of these reforms is premature, it is 
clear that the reforms have significantly changed the character of Ethics Law in Ohio. 
The OEC is now a more proactive and less reactive body than it was previously.  
There are many reasons behind the OEC's transformation. First, additional funding has 
facilitated the hiring of additional staff members who can carry out educational, 
investigatory, financial disclosure, and opinion writing responsibilities. Second, public 
comment provisions allow the OEC to publicly comment on criminal referrals and, in 
turn, inform the public of the OEC's activities. Finally, the OEC's new-found alternative 
dispute resolution authority will allow it to deal with minor ethics violations in a more 
flexible and less costly manner. The OEC now has, for the first time, the authority to 
resolve ethics violations in a manner commensurate with the alleged transgression. 
Moreover, these reforms will work to insure that public officials and employees serve the 
interests of the citizens of Ohio.  
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